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1Abstract
When supervisors have imperfect information about the soundness of banks, they
may be unaware of insolvency problems that develop in the interval between on-site
examinations. Supervising banks more often will alleviate this problem but will in-
crease the costs of supervision. This paper analyzes the trade-oﬀs that supervisors
face between the cost of supervision and their need to monitor banks eﬀectively. We
ﬁrst characterize the optimal supervisory policy, in terms of the time between exam-
inations and the closure rule at examinations, and compare it with the policy of an
independent supervisor. We then show that making this supervisor accountable for
deposit insurance losses in general reduces the excessive forbearance of the indepen-
dent supervisor and may also improve on the time between examinations. Finally,
we extend our analysis to the impact of depositor-preference laws on supervisors’
monitoring incentives and show that these laws may lead to conﬂicting eﬀects on the
time between examinations and closure policy vis-à-vis the social optimum.
Résumé
Quand les superviseurs ont une information imparfaite de la santé des banques,
ils peuvent ne pas avoir soupçon des problèmes d’insolvabilité qui se manifestent dans
l’intervalle de temps entre les vériﬁcations sur place. Une supervision plus fréquente
peut atténuer cette diﬃculté, mais au prix d’un renchérissement des coûts. Ce papier
analyse le compromis entre eﬃcacité et coût de la supervision que rencontrent les su-
perviseurs. Nous caractérisons d’abord la politique de supervision optimale, en termes
de temps entre les vériﬁcations et de règles de fermeture après les vériﬁcations, et la
comparons à celle d’un superviseur indépendant. Nous montrons ensuite qu’un super-
viseur comptable des pertes de l’assurance-dépôt tend à marquer moins d’indulgence
qu’un superviseur indépendant et à réduire l’intervalle de temps entre les vériﬁcations.
Finalement, nous étendons notre analyse à l’incidence des lois de préférence vis-à-vis
des déposants sur les incitations des superviseurs à contrôler. Nous montrons que de
telles lois peuvent aboutir à des eﬀets contraires sur la fréquence des vériﬁcations et
la sévérité de la politique de fermeture par rapport à l’optimum social.
Keywords: Deposit Insurance, Depositor Preference, Supervision
JEL classiﬁcation: G21, G28
21 Introduction
A key function of bank supervisors is to monitor banks.1 This requires them to
gather timely and reliable information, which they do through regulatory reports
and on-site examinations. Examinations are pivotal because they enable supervisors
to conﬁrm the accuracy of the information disclosed by banks and give them access
to conﬁdential information. In addition, they give supervisors an opportunity to
enforce regulations timely. On-site examinations are, however, costly. As a result,
supervisors with budgetary concerns face a trade-oﬀbetween their ability to monitor
banks eﬀectively and the cost of supervision. Solving this trade-oﬀ entails choosing
the “quality” of supervision.
In this paper, we develop a model where the quality of supervision is determined
by two policies: the time interval between on-site examinations and the decision
on whether to close the bank at the time of examination. Supervisors’ choice of
these policies will, of course, depend on their mandate as deﬁned by governments.
We evaluate the importance of supervisors’ mandate by comparing the policies of
an independent supervisor with those of a supervisor who is also accountable for
deposit insurance. Finally, we extend the latter arrangement to study the impact of
depositor-preference laws on the quality of supervision.2
To begin with, it is useful to understand the general rationale for supervision.
This rationale is directly linked to the functions performed by banks. The infor-
mation asymmetries that make banks’ provision of liquidity insurance to depositors
and monitoring services to investors advantageous also make it diﬃcult for them to
borrow in the market in the event of a liquidity shock.3 Consequently, a liquidity
shock may generate an insolvency problem which culminates in system failure. This
systemic risk forms the support of the classical argument proposing mechanisms to
protect banks from liquidity shocks.
Bagehot (1873), for example, suggested the central bank commits to lending to
any solvent bank with liquidity problems. Such a bank, however, would be able to
borrow from the market. It is when there is uncertainty about the bank’s ﬁnancial
condition that the bank will have problems borrowing from the market.4 This market
failure provides a rationale for supervising banks in order to be able to evaluate their
ﬁnancial condition more accurately than the market. Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
proposed instead to protect banks through deposit insurance. This mechanism is
1Throughout the paper we use interchangeably the terms monitoring and supervision. We also
use interchangeably the terms on-site examinations and audits.
2Under a depositor-preference law, depositors, and by extension the deposit insurance provider,
have a senior claim over the other claimants of the bank. Thus, in the event of bankruptcy, they
have to be fully reimbursed before the other claims can be honored. The United States, Switzerland,
Hong-Kong, Malaysia and Argentina are examples of countries that have some form of depositor
preference.
3Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Flannery (1994) and Diamond and Rajan (1998) explain the ad-
vantages of combining these two functions in a single intermediary.
4Flannery (1996) and Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000) provide a rationale for a lender of last
resort based on interbank market failures arising from asymmetry of information.
3eﬀective against runs by depositors but by charging banks a ﬂat premium it gives
rise to moral hazard.5 This provides a rationale for supervising banks to control for
their risk-shifting incentives.
Given these rationales for supervision, it becomes apparent that if supervision were
costless it would be desirable to monitor banks continuously. Supervision, however,
is costly. As a result, supervisors with budgetary responsibilities face important
trade-oﬀs.6
The traditional trade-oﬀput forth in the literature is one between closing early to
save on audit costs and closing late to put oﬀmeeting the costs of bankruptcy. This
trade-oﬀbuilds on the assumption that continuous auditing is not prohibitively costly.
We deviate from this literature by assuming that audit costs prevent continuous
auditing. If on-site examinations at discrete intervals are the only possibility, then
the trade-oﬀsupervisors face has a new important component – the time interval
between examinations. In addition to this choice, supervisors in our model also select
their actions at the time of on-site examinations. We limit these actions to either
closing the bank or letting it continue in operation.
We motivate the need for a bank supervisor by assuming that a bank failure is
costly, and that bankruptcy costs are lower when the bank is closed by the supervisor
rather than by its shareholders. Because the supervisor cannot audit the bank con-
tinuously and bank shareholders may ﬁnd it advantageous to close the bank between
on-site examinations, a cost minimizing supervisor who accounts for bankruptcy costs
faces the following problem: increasing the time interval between examinations and
letting the bank continue in operation saves on audit and bankruptcy costs respec-
tively, but it increases the chances of shareholders closing the bank between on-site
examinations with the corresponding higher bankruptcy costs.
Even though the supervisor in our model accounts for the social costs of bank-
ruptcy, his policies diﬀer from those of a social planner because we assume he also
incurs a political cost of bankruptcy. This diﬀerence between the supervisor’s poli-
cies and the social optimum gives us an opportunity to study the impact of diﬀerent
mandates of the supervisory agency on the ‘quality’of bank supervision. We focus on
two alternative mandates: the case of an independent supervisor who accounts only
for the costs of supervision and bankruptcy costs, and the case of a supervisor who
also accounts for the costs a bank failure imposes on the deposit insurance provider.
Finally, the analysis of the latter mandate when the bank borrows from creditors
other than depositors also leads us to study a novel impact of depositor-preference
laws. The literature on these laws has focused on the cost of funds to banks and the
cost a bank failure imposes on the deposit insurance provider. We focus instead on
5Asymmetry of information makes it impossible, or undesirable from a welfare viewpoint, to
charge banks fairly priced premiums, Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1992) and Freixas and Rochet
(1995), respectively.
6Ad e t e r m i n a n to ft h e s et r a d e - o ﬀ si st h et i m ed e c a yo ft h ev a l u eo ft h ee x a m i n a t i o ni n f o r m a t i o n .
Hirtle and Lopez (1999) study this issue based on US data and ﬁnd that the private component of
examination information ceases to provide useful information about the current condition of a bank
after one and a half to three years.
4their impact on the monitoring incentives of the supervisor and show that they may
have conﬂicting eﬀects on the policies of a supervisor vis-à-vis the social optimum.
The reason is that, as researchers have pointed out, a lender’s incentives to monitor
a borrower vary both with the priority of the lender’s claim and with the borrower’s
ﬁnancial condition at the time monitoring is exerted. In our model, the conﬂicting
eﬀects arise because the supervisor cannot monitor the bank continuously and the
bank’s ﬁnancial condition changes between on-site examinations. As a result, depos-
itor preference may improve supervisor’s incentives to close a bank at the time of an
on-site examination, but it can also lead him to wait a long time between examina-
tions, thereby increasing the opportunities for bank shareholders to close the bank
voluntarily with the corresponding higher costs of bankruptcy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews
the related literature. Section 3 presents our model and the solution of the social
planner. Section 4 analyzes the policy choices of an independent supervisor and those
of a supervisor who accounts for the losses a bank failure imposes on the depositor
insurance provider. Section 5 studies how the policies of the latter supervisor change
when the bank also borrows from non-depositor creditors and a depositor-preference
law is introduced. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
Our paper is close to the literature that examines the optimal closure time of ailing
banks. Acharya and Dreyfus (1989), for example, derive the fair deposit insurance
premium and the optimal closure rule for a pure cost-minimizing deposit insurer.
Fries, Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) derive the optimal closure rule and bailout
policy taking into account equityholders’ incentives to recapitalize banks and regula-
tors’ objective of minimizing bankruptcy costs. Ronn and Verma (1986), Pennacchi
(1987) and Allen and Saunders (1993) also consider the issue of diﬀerent closure rules
but they focus on the impact of these rules on the fair insurance premium.
Like these papers, we use a dynamic contingent claims model to examine super-
visors’ optimal policies. In contrast with them, however, we assume that the cost
of on-site examinations prevents continuous auditing. This diﬀerence is important
because it introduces a true information asymmetry between banks and supervisors
and gives us the opportunity to address the question of how often supervisors should
examine banks. Bhattacharya, Plank, Strobl and Zechner (2000) also derive the op-
timal closure rule in a dynamic contingent claims model where there is asymmetry
of information between the bank and its supervisor, but they assume auditing is
stochastic with constant intensity.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the institutional allocation of bank
regulatory powers.7 This literature, however, has focused on the optimal institutional
allocation of the lender of last resort function. The recent debate on the institutional
7See, for example, Repullo (2000) and Kahn and Santos (2000, 2002).
5allocation of bank supervision in turn has focused on the issues arising from placing
this function in either the central bank or an independent agency.8 Our model consid-
ers instead the optimal allocation of supervision between an independent supervisor
and a supervisor with deposit insurance responsibilities.9
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on the role of debt priorities. There
has been a great deal of interest in the seniority of debt claims in connection with
the funding of nonﬁnancial ﬁrms.10 In the context of banks, there has been less
attention to this issue and much of the focus has been on the potential eﬀects of
requiring banks to fund themselves with subordinated debt.11 The literature on
depositor-preference laws, in turn, has focused on the impact of these laws on the
cost of funds to banks and the liabilities of the deposit insurance provider in case
of a bank failure.12 An exception is Birchler (2000), who considers the role of debt
priorities in the optimization of monitoring eﬀorts when investors diﬀer with respect
to (privately known) information costs. He ﬁnds that the large number of depositors
a bank has to interact with calls for a standardization of contracts it oﬀers them.
In order to keep small depositors from wasteful monitoring it might be eﬃcient to
oﬀer them seniority over larger depositors who will then have more incentives to
monitor the bank. Our paper diﬀers from Birchler’s in that we assume all depositors
are identical. In addition, our interest in the priority of depositors’ claims is not
because of its impact on the bank’s funding costs but instead because of its impact
on supervisors’ incentives to monitor banks.
3T h e m o d e l
Our model has similarities with Fries, Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), but it dif-
fers from theirs in an important way. In contrast with them, we assume that exam-
ining banks continuously is not cost-eﬀective. This diﬀerence is important because,
among other things, it requires supervisors to determine the optimal time interval
between on-site examinations. The full extent of the implications of this diﬀerence
will become clear in Section 3.2.
We take the “bank” to be a portfolio of risky activities, including those of making
illiquid loans. These activities generate a stochastic cash ﬂow of gt per dollar of
deposits and per unit of time. The amount of total deposits could be any process of
bounded variation, but we impose homogeneity by scaling all quantities per dollar of
deposits. The only source of uncertainty comes from the cash ﬂow which is modeled
8See Haubrich (1996), Goodhart and Shoenmaker (1998) and Vives (2001) for a review of the
arguments put forward in this debate.
9Kahn and Santos (2000) also study the optimal allocation of supervision between the central
bank and the deposit insurance provider, but in their model there is no role for an independent
supervisory agency.
10 See, for example, Diamond (1993), Repullo and Suarez (1998), Park (2000), Welch (1997) and
Longhofer and Santos (2000, 2002).
11See Board of Governors (1999) for a review of the literature on subordinated debt.




= µdt+ σd￿ wt, (1)
where µ and σ are constant parameters and d￿ wt the increment to a standard Brownian
motion under the empirical probability. The drift µ must be less than the short rate
of interest r for an equilibrium to exist.13 To rule out the possibility of inﬁnitely-lived
banks, we also assume that µ<σ 2/2. This implies that the bank’s cash ﬂow grows in
expectation at rate µ but falls almost surely (path by path) to zero. In other words,
the bank is doomed, although its lifetime is arbitrarily large.
3.1 Bank shareholders’ problem
Net cash ﬂows available to bank shareholders are gt −ρ, where ρ denotes the average
rate paid per dollar of deposits, including the interests earned by depositors and
the premium levied by the deposit insurance agency. We assume that all deposits
are insured and that ρ = r + γ, where γ is the (constant) premium on insured
deposits.14 Negative net cash ﬂows imply that shareholders inject capital in some
states of the world to maintain the bank as a going concern.15 If they stop making
disbursements at some point τ, the bank is closed. Thus, under limited liability, bank
shareholders’ participation constraint can be viewed as the solution to the following
optimal stopping time problem










where g denotes the initial income level, V the corresponding (normalized) equity
value and r the risk-free rate of interest.
The unlimited liability value of bank equity, Vul(g)=g/(r − µ) − ρ/r, is the
diﬀerence between the expected discounted value of the bank’s risky cash ﬂow and
the value of the annuity ρ. We call g∗, the value for which Vul is zero, the insolvency
level. When gt ∈ (g∗,ρ), the bank is illiquid but solvent. The following proposition
shows that when gt is less than g∗, shareholders choose to maintain the bank in
operation by injecting funds as long as cash ﬂows remain above an endogenously
determined level g, which deﬁnes the participation constraint of shareholders.
13The bank’s fair equity value satisﬁes the fundamental equation of ﬁnance which requires that
the return on bank equity equal the ﬂow of income to equity-holders plus expected capital gains.
14Throughout the paper we assume, for simpliﬁcation reasons, that the deposit insurance premium
is exogenous, and that there is no repricing of risk as new information on the bank ﬁnancial condition
is gathered. We accordingly set γ =0in simulations.
15We implicitly assume that bank shareholders have unlimited resources to keep the bank in
operation. This however does not imply that they would choose to ﬁnance the bank entirely with
equity.
7Figure 1: Full and unlimited value of bank equity
Proposition 1 Bank shareholders let the bank continue in operation as long as cash
ﬂows are greater than the participation constraint g =[ −λ/(1−λ)]g∗, where λ is the




















The bank fails at time τ =i n f{t : gt = g}.
Proofs of propositions are given in Appendix. Figure 1 displays the value of the
bank equity as a function of the state variable g for a particular choice of parameter
values.16 It is the sum of two terms. The ﬁrst is the bank’s net present value under
unlimited liability, Vul(g). The second is the value of the “down-and-in” barrier option
of abandoning the bank when gt hits the lower boundary g. The option payoﬀis the
liability transferred to the bank claimants upon failure, ρ/r − g/(r − µ), which is







where τ is the knock-in time.
The present value of the bank’s assets at the time of default is g/(r − µ)=
−[λ/(1 − λ)]ρ/r. Proposition 1 shows that the negative parameter λ depends only
16 All parameter values are per dollar of deposits. Our benchmark case has r =2 % , γ =0 ,
σ =2 0 % , µ =0and ξ =0 .2%. This implies an insolvency level and a participation constraint of
g∗ =2 %and g =0 .76%, respectively.
8on µ, r and σ and reﬂects the value to shareholders of the option to abandon the
bank. A higher volatility σ, a lower interest rate r or a lower drift µ all contribute
towards lowering g by making the option more valuable.
3.2 The social planner problem
Consider a social planner who takes into account the value of the bank, that of
the deposit insurance agency, as well as audit and social bankruptcy costs. The
latter are intended to capture the administrative costs of closing the bank and paying
back depositors (excluding the costs of reimbursing them) as well as the negative
externalities associated with a bank failure. Given that there is no moral hazard in
our model, we give our social planner a useful role by assuming that social bankruptcy
costs are lower when she closes the bank than when shareholders do so. These social
costs are noted cs (s for social planner) and cb (b for bank), respectively, with cs <c b.
There are some reasons to believe that the “preventive” cost cs should be lower
than the “curative” cost cb. An orderly workout will likely lead to lower costs than a
resolution process where the bank unexpectedly declares bankruptcy, as the bank’s
economic value may be better preserved. In addition, the externalities associated with
a bank failure, such as disruptions in ﬁnancial markets or interruptions in payments,
clearing and settlement systems, are likely to be less extensive if they are managed
in conjunction with the decision to close the bank rather than after the bankruptcy
announcement. Finally, the social planner is concerned about the risk of contagion,
which will be heightened if the bank failure is imposed abruptly on the ﬁnancial
system as a fait accompli.
The basic question we ask in this section is whether the social planner can improve
on the simple laissez-faire policy under which the bank is allowed to fail when share-
holders’ participation constraint is met. As we shall see, the optimal policy depends
on the information set available to the social planner. We start by assuming that
there is no asymmetry of information, i.e., that the social planner is able to observe
the bank’s cash ﬂow at no cost. We then examine the case of a social planner who
incurs an audit cost whenever she needs to ascertain the bank’s ﬁnancial condition.
3.2.1 Perfect information
Under the laissez-faire policy, we know from Proposition 1 that bank shareholders
will close the bank at time τ when gτ = g. As a result, the value of the bank and


















9Adding up these two functions, and subtracting the discounted bankruptcy costs, we










where the initials LF stand for laissez-faire.
Given that the social planner continuously observes the bank cash ﬂow gt, she
can implement any threshold above the participation constraint g with the relevant
bankruptcy cost cs. However, liquidation is costly and it is optimal to put oﬀmeeting
the costs of bankruptcy until gt = g. As the social planner is more eﬃcient at closing
the bank than bank shareholders, her optimal policy is to wait and apply her special











where the initials PI refer to the perfect information optimum. With perfect infor-
mation and costly liquidation, the participation constraint is always binding, which
results in a degenerate optimal closure policy.
3.2.2 Asymmetric information
We now assume that the social planner does not observe the bank’s cashﬂow gt unless
she incurs the audit cost ξ. A key implication of this asymmetry of information is
that the time when the participation constraint of bank shareholders is reached comes
as a complete surprise. As a result, the social planner can no longer intervene right
before the bank ﬁles for bankruptcy to minimize bankruptcy costs. However, because
the social planner has speciﬁc skills at liquidating the bank, she is able to improve on
the benchmark of no intervention if auditing the bank is not too expensive. Under
these circumstances, the optimal policy is determined by both the frequency of bank
examinations and the closure rule at the time of examination.
Consider what happens if the social planner decides to close the bank right away.
In this case, social welfare is g/(r−µ)−1−cs. The social planner can thus improve
on WLF by generating a cost relief of Γ
+







We call Γ0(g) the immediate closure gain. It is positive as long as the observed cash
ﬂow g is lower than the threshold ￿ g = g(cs/cb)1/λ. The cut-oﬀpoint ￿ g is a rough
metaphor for the stiﬀness of intervention, because the interval [g,￿ g] is the closure
region that the social planner would implement if she had only one opportunity to
intervene. For this reason, we call ￿ g the stopgap closure rule.
More generally, let Γ(g) be the intervention gain, relative to the benchmark of no
intervention, that the social planner can obtain by optimally adjusting her closure
decision and the frequency of bank examinations. The function Γ does not take into
10account the audit cost that the social planner has just paid to learn about the true
cash ﬂow, but it captures all future gains originating from the possible recurrence of
the optimal closure policy. Conditioning on the knowledge of g, we can derive social










where the initials AI refer to asymmetric information. Since the stopgap policy
is available anyway, we have Γ(g) ≥ Γ+
0 (g), with equality holding when immediate
closure is chosen. We get the following result.
Proposition 2 Let ξ<c b − cs. Under asymmetric information, the optimal social
policy upon examination is characterized by a partition of {g>g} and a stationary
time-to-examination function θ(g) such that if:
(a) Γ(g)=Γ +
0 (g) > 0: the social planner closes the bank right away;
(b) Γ(g) > Γ
+
0 (g) ≥ 0: the social planner examines the bank after time θ(g);
(c) Γ(g)=Γ
+
0 (g)=0 : the social planner lets the bank continue in operation and
decides not to examine it again.
The function Γ(g) captures the social gain of intervention. It is decreasing and satis-













where the supremum is attained at θ(g).
The interpretation of Proposition 2 is straightforward. For low initial cash ﬂow g,
bank shareholders’ participation constraint is going to be hit soon. To save on bank-
ruptcy costs, the social planner forecloses that possibility by winding up the bank
immediately. For intermediate g, social welfare is increased if the social planner defers
closure. The deferred closure gain
G(θ,g)=e−rθE
￿
Γ(gθ) − ξ;τ ≥ θ
￿
(5)
can be interpreted as the price of a “down-and-out” barrier option maturing at θ and
paying oﬀ Γ(g) − ξ if the barrier g = g has not been reached. The social planner
maximizes the value of this option over all possible times to expiry for given g.T h i s





. Finally when g is suﬃciently high, the expected audit costs
may outrun the beneﬁts of closing preventively. In this case, the social planner cannot
improve on the benchmark social welfare WLF.
113.3 The two-examination problem
The optimal control problem (4) is diﬃcult to solve explicitly. The deferred closure
gain G in (5) can be derived from a partial diﬀerential equation with boundary
conditions depending on Γ. Conversely, the intervention gain function Γ in (4) is
obtained as the maximum of G over θ in the free-boundary deferred closure region.
To simplify the analysis, we make the ﬁnal assumption that the audit technology
available to the social planner can be used at most twice.17 At time 0, the social
planner observes the bank’s cash ﬂow and decides whether the bank can be left open
and, if it is, for how long. At the second examination, if there is one, the social
planner either closes the bank or leaves it open, in which case the bank remains in
operation until its shareholders eventually choose to pull out.
Under these conditions, the optimal social policy is deﬁned by: (a) the three
regions deﬁning the type of intervention to be performed at the time of the ﬁrst
examination (either close the bank right away, or examine it again within a given
period of time, or never examine it), (b) the time-to-last-examination function in the
intermediate region, and (c) the stopgap closure rule following the last examination,
in case there is one (that is, in case bank shareholders did not close the bank before
this examination).
The continuous line in the upper panel of Figure 2 illustrates the immediate
closure gain Γ+
0 (g) applicable to social welfare at the time of the last examination.18
The stopgap closure rule is ￿ g. Because the social planner has a cost advantage in
closing banks, the welfare gain is all the higher, the closer cash ﬂows are to the bank
participation constraint g. The maximum cost relief is cb − cs.





0 (gθ);τ ≥ θ
￿
− e−rθξQ(τ ≥ θ), (6)
where Q denotes the empirical probability. The ﬁrst term is the reward from inter-
vening at time θ. It is positive under two circumstances: the bank must be still alive
(τ ≥ θ) and its cashﬂow must lie in the critical region (g,￿ g). The second term is
the expected cost of auditing if the bank has not defaulted. Obviously, the social
planner closes the bank if the expected audit costs outrun the deferred closure gain.
For example, if cb − cs <ξ , the ﬁrst term on the right-hand-side of (6) falls short of
the second at all points in time, implying that G1 (θ,g) is negative. We must assume
that ξ<c b − cs to allow for non-degenerate intervention policies.
In maximizing (6) over θ, the social planner attempts to ﬁnd out the time it takes
for future cash ﬂows to reach the critical region (g,￿ g). If successful, she reaps the
beneﬁts of declaring the bank insolvent before bank equity-holders pull out. This
is when the payoﬀis the largest. Setting θ to a larger value implies that current
17We have obtained the general stationary solution using numerical simulations. The stationary
solution yields a broader deferred closure region and a higher frequency of examinations than under
the restricted two-examination setup. Details are available from the authors upon request.
18 Parameter values are set as in Footnote 16 with cb =0 .5 and cs =0 .4.
12Figure 2: Two-examination optimal social policy
information about the bank’s cash ﬂow will have decayed at the time of the last
examination. Choosing a smaller θ implies on the contrary that this information will
still be valuable. We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Let ξ>c b − cs. With only two examinations available, the optimal
social policy is deﬁned by:
(a) A partition of g indicating the type of intervention to be performed at the time
of the ﬁrst examination. The bank is closed if g<g 1, is examined at time θ(g)
if g1 ≤ g ≤ g2 and is no longer examined if g>g 2. The intervention gain on
























(b) A closer rule, the stopgap rule, to be implemented at the time of the last ex-
amination, in case there is one. At that time the bank is closed if g≤￿ g, where
￿ g = g(cs/cb)1/λ, and left open otherwise.
13For simpliﬁcation reasons, we chose to disregard the role of bank capital standards
in this paper. However, the three regions (g,g1), (g1,g 2) and (g2,∞) can be viewed as
a metaphor for the speciﬁcations of capital categories which trigger the set of actions
that regulators have to take under a prompt corrective action program. The ﬁrst
would be the “undercapitalized” category, where strict mandatory actions are taken,
the second the “adequately capitalized” one, where banks are subjected to periodic
scrutiny, and the last the “well capitalized” one, where no action is called for.19
Note that a rule based on cash ﬂows g is equivalent to a rule based on the bank’s
leverage ratio, since the capital-assets ratio is a monotonic transformation of the value
of assets per unit of deposits g/(r − µ). In our model, however, capital categories
are not deﬁned according to predetermined leverage ratios. Rather, they come out
as bank-speciﬁc rules that the social planner is willing to adopt to spare the ﬁnancial
system part of the costs associated with unexpected panics and banking runs.
4 The supervisory agency problem
Ideally, a government would like to design a supervisory authority that mimics the
social planner of the previous section. However, diﬃculties of varying order will
prevent the government from attaining this goal. Note, for example, that even if the
objectives of the supervisory authority could be speciﬁed so completely as to render
them perfectly consonant with those of the government, the incentive diﬃculties
arising from the agency problem and imperfections in monitoring this authority would
still lead to conﬂicts between its objectives and those of the government.
In what follows, we assume that by giving the supervisory authority the “respon-
sibility” for bank failures, the government successfully makes it accountable for the
social costs of a bank failure and by giving it budgetary responsibilities the gov-
ernment successfully makes it a cost minimizer. We introduce a friction with the
government’s objectives by assuming that the supervisor incurs a political cost of
bankruptcy whenever he closes the bank. To simplify the analysis, we assume that
this political cost of bankruptcy occurs only when the supervisor closes the bank, that
is, he does not incur it when bank shareholders do it. A rationale for this diﬀerence is
that if the bank is declared bankrupt by its shareholders, the supervisor can always
diﬀuse some of the blame he will otherwise face when he forces the bank to close.20
Like the social planner, the bank supervisor has two controls: ﬁrst, the time
interval between on-site examinations and, second, whether or not to close the bank
at examination time. For the sake of tractability, we continue to assume that the
supervisor considers making at most one further trip to the bank. Given our political
cost assumption, the cost is cb when bank shareholders declare bankruptcy, and c￿
s >
19The adequately capitalized threshold g2 can be inﬁnite if the social planner’s cost advantage
cb −cs is suﬃciently large.
20It is worth noting that the results of this section hold if we assume that the supervisor also
incurs a political cost of bankruptcy when bank shareholders close the bank but that this political
cost is smaller than the one he faces when he makes the closure decision.
14cs when the supervisor declares the bank closed, with c￿
s <c b.
In what follows, we determine the optimal policy of this supervisory agency and
compare it to the social optimum of the previous section. We then investigate the
implications for the optimal supervisory policy of a change in the mandate of the
supervisory agency, when it is made accountable for the losses the deposit insurance
provider incurs when the bank goes bankrupt.
4.1 A stand-alone supervisory agency
We start by considering a stand-alone supervisor, that is, a supervisor who is account-
able for bank failures but does not take into account the cost these failures impose
on the provider of deposit insurance. Let Csa(g) be his cost function conditional on
knowing g. The stand-alone supervisor minimizes expected bankruptcy and audit
costs. For the moment we write c￿
s = cs.
If at time zero the supervisor considers leaving the bank open and examining it



















The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is the cost incurred if bank shareholders happen
to close the bank between the current on-site examination and the next one at time
θ. The second captures the cost incurred if the bank is still in operation at time θ.
On that occasion, the supervisor incurs the audit cost ξ and either closes the bank
at that time, in which case the cost cs prevails, or leaves it open, in which case bank
shareholders eventually close it when g = g, imposing a cost cb on the supervisory

























where G1 is the deferred closure gain in (6).




























The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is the expected cost in the absence of interven-
tion. The second, as seen before in (7), is the cost relief brought to the supervisor
15by the optimal intervention policy. The only diﬀerence is that now c￿
s >c s. Based
on this result, we can assess the “quality” of supervision by a stand-alone supervisor
(that is, how his policies compare to the social optimum) through the analysis of an
increase in cs.
Proposition 4 The stand-alone supervisor is more forbearing than the social planner
in the following sense:
(a) The stopgap closure rule is lower, that is, ￿ gsa < ￿ g;
(b) The “undercapitalized” and “adequately capitalized” thresholds are both lower,
that is, gsa
1 <g 1 and gsa
2 <g 2.
Also, the stand-alone supervisor chooses a time interval between on-site examina-
tions which is longer than that of the social planner, that is, θsa(g) >θ (g), provided
µ is suﬃciently high.
There are three possible indicators of forbearance in our model. One is the cut-oﬀ
point ￿ g determining whether or not the bank is closed following the last examination.
The other two are the g1 and g2 boundaries marking the three regimes at the time of
the ﬁrst examination. Based on these classiﬁcations and Proposition 4, we conclude
that the stand-alone supervisor is too forbearing.
The ﬁnal determinant of the “quality” of supervision is the time interval between
on-site examinations. As the (gsa
1 ,gsa
2 ) region shifts to the left of (g1,g 2), this time
interval is also aﬀected. To the right of gsa
1 the supervisor leaves the bank open
in situations where the social planner would otherwise close it, so θsa(g) is larger
than θ(g). To the right of gsa
2 the supervisor relinquishes his right to monitor (the
time interval is inﬁnite) when the social planner would otherwise exercise it, so again
θsa(g) is larger than θ(g). In between the result is less clear-cut. However, when µ is
suﬃciently high the stand-alone supervisor sets a longer time interval between on-site
examinations.21 The rationale is as follows. Due to the political costs of bankruptcy,
closing the bank preventively is less advantageous. Looking at it from time zero, the
supervisor will save on audit costs and plan the second examination only when his
cost advantage is the largest, i.e., when the bank is expected to be in a weak ﬁnancial
position, and this requires waiting longer.
4.2 Supervisory agency with deposit insurance responsibili-
ties
As we saw above, the “quality” of supervision of a stand-alone supervisor diﬀers
from the social optimum in two important ways: there is excess forbearance and
on-site examinations are too far apart. A problem with the stand-alone supervisor
21More precisely, there exists a function µc(σ,cb/cs,g/g) such that ∂θ/∂cs is positive whenever
µ ≥ µc.A tg = ￿ g, the critical value µc is negative except when both cb/cs and σ are large.
16is that he does not account for the costs his policies might impose on the provider
of deposit insurance. This suggests that mixing these two regulatory functions may
improve supervision. One way of accomplishing this is to have a single agency with
both supervision and deposit insurance responsibilities. An alternative would be to
maintain the two agencies separated but make the ﬁrst accountable for the losses that
bank failures impose on the second.
In a few countries, deposit insurance agencies can intervene in a bank or take
legal action against its managers, but this is a rare occurrence. In a recent survey,
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) ﬁnd out that, of the 60 countries which responded
on this account, more than half do not in fact have such power. But even when
no supervisory power is devolved to the deposit insurance system, supervisors may
implicitly take into account the cost that bank failures impose on it. For example,
Mishkin (1997) points out that the FDICIA requires that a report be produced by
the supervisory agencies if a bank failure imposes costs on the FDIC. A key aspect of
this institutional arrangement is that it improves supervisors’ incentives to lean more
on the standing of the deposit insurance system.
We next examine the policy of a supervisor entrusted with deposit insurance re-
sponsibilities and compare it with that of the stand-alone supervisor.22 The important
diﬀerence between the two institutional arrangements is that under the new arrange-
ment when the bank is closed, the supervisor has to reimburse one unit to depositors
and is entitled to the asset liquidation value g/(r − µ), up to the outstanding claims
held by insured depositors.
Consider ﬁrst the stopgap policy at the time of the last examination. If the













where g is the observed cash ﬂow upon examination. Alternatively, if it is presented












where we have used the fact that the liquidation value of assets is less than deposits


















and corresponding immediate closure gain
Γdi
0 (g)=Cdi
b (g) − Cdi
s (g).
22Since we have set γ =0 , we neglect the deposit insurance premium. Recall that throughout the
paper the insurance premium is assumed to be exogenous.
17The stopgap policy rule ￿ gdi is given by the solution to Γdi
0 (g)=0 .
Next, consider the supervisor’s cost function conditional on knowing g at the time










where the intervention gain is
Γdi










0 (gθ) − ξ; τ ≥ θ
￿￿
.
The argument where the supremum is attained is noted θdi(g).
If the supervisor closes the bank following the second examination, his immediate
closure gain, Γdi
0 (g), is now aﬀected by an opportunity gain equal to the diﬀerence
between the losses to be expected if the bank is closed later by shareholders and the
actual losses if it is closed today. An important property of our model is that this


















is positive for all levels of cash ﬂow g. That is, supervisory intervention at the time
of the second examination always brings relief to the deposit insurance agency. The
following proposition shows that this provides the supervisor with insurance respon-
sibilities with an incentive to be less forbearing than the stand-alone supervisor, at
least when the bank is adequately capitalized.




s. Compared to a stand-alone supervisor,
the policy of a supervisor vested with deposit insurance responsibilities is such that:
(a) The stopgap closure rule is higher, that is, ￿ gdi > ￿ gsa;







s implies that even with deposit insurance re-
sponsibilities the supervisor still does not close the bank at the time of the second
examination when the value of its assets equals that of its deposits, that is, when
g/r − µ =1 . Allowing Cdi
b (g)
￿ ￿
g=r−µ to be larger than c￿
s will in general lead the su-
pervisor to allow the bank to operate over two regions (ga,g b) and (gc,g d) and close
it in between, preventing any meaningful comparison with the stand-alone case.23
23The issue arises because when the relief in deposit insurance losses is suﬃciently large around
g = r − µ the supervisor chooses to close the bank, even though he may “gamble for resurrection”
on a range (ga,g b) to the left of r − µ. This behavior will be examined in more detail in the next
section.
18The results of Proposition 5 can be interpreted as follows. Adding one dollar to
cash ﬂows at the time of the second examination dilutes the prospect of the bank
closing voluntarily, inducing supervisors to relax the stopgap closure rule. With
deposit insurance responsibilities, however, the same unit increase also lowers deposit
insurance losses, restoring part of supervisors’ incentives to close. Thus, the second-
examination closure rule ￿ gdi must lie to the right of the stand-alone supervisor’s ￿ gsa.
Consider next what happens at the time of the ﬁrst examination. The supervisor
has to compare the expected deposit insurance relief that will be obtained if he allows
the bank to operate and happens to close it at the second examination with the
current one. When g = g2, the deposit insurance agency is currently fully protected
and its standing can only deteriorate as time goes by. Therefore, entrusting the
supervisor with a stake in deposit insurance liabilities gives him a good reason to be
able to improve its standing in the future, i.e., to keep the bank under scrutiny by
raising the adequately capitalized boundary g2.
The implications of making the supervisor accountable for deposit insurance losses
on the other two endogenous variables of our model, g1 and θ(g), are less clear,
however. If g1 is large, the current standing of the deposit insurance is still very good
and provides the supervisor with one more reason to close immediately, i.e., to raise
the undercapitalized threshold g1. If on the contrary g1 is low, the deposit insurance
agency is hardly entitled to any relief when the bank is closed. In this situation, the
supervisor would rather gamble on the upside potential for good performance of the
bank to alleviate deposit insurance losses, and this requires lowering g1. Naturally, the
indeterminacy about g1 funnels into the time to examination. It can be shown that if
a marginal stake in deposit insurance losses increases the undercapitalized threshold,
it also shortens the interval between examinations at that point. The indeterminacy
about θdi thus reﬂects that of gdi
1 .
On the basis of Proposition 5, we conclude our welfare analysis by noting that
vesting supervisors with deposit insurance responsibilities falls short of reversing all
the eﬀects produced by the assumed political cost of bankruptcy. Nevertheless, it un-
ambiguously restores two of the three forbearance indicators. Supervisors are given
improved incentives to monitor adequately capitalized banks following the ﬁrst ex-
amination and to close them at the second examination.
5 The role of depositor preference laws
In the beginning of the 1990s, deposit insurance in the US went through several im-
portant changes in an attempt to reduce FDIC losses. In 1991, the FDICIA required
that a least-cost resolution strategy be put in place, unless a systemic risk exemption
could be invoked. As a result, the adopted resolution strategies have moved away
from the traditional payoﬀmethod in order to shift the burden of losses on uninsured
depositors. In 1993, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act instituted depositor
preference for all insured depository institutions. As a result, domestic depositors,
and by extension the FDIC, became senior vis-à-vis foreign uninsured depositors and
19interbank suppliers of federal funds. These changes in the priority of bank claims had
the eﬀect of altering not only the relative costs of banks’ funding sources and their
stakeholders’ discipline, but also the monitoring incentives of bank supervisors. Yet,
most of the literature on deposit preference laws has turned its attention to the former
eﬀects. This section tries to bridge this gap by focusing on the impact of depositor
preference on the monitoring incentives of a supervisor who is also accountable for
the costs a bank failure may impose on the provider of deposit insurance.
In order to analyze the aforementioned impact of depositor preference, it is neces-
sary for the bank to raise funding from creditors other than depositors. The presence
of other creditors’ claims in the bank’s capital structure, however, opens up a vast
array of issues.24 For example, what will happen if the supervisor, in addition to tak-
ing into account the costs a bank failure imposes on deposit insurance, also considers
the costs incurred by other creditors? If the supervisor only takes into account the
impact of bankruptcy costs on deposit insurance, his monitoring incentives will be
aﬀected by, for example, the monitoring exercised by the other creditors.
In what follows, and to simplify the analysis, we consider only the case where the
bank supervisor accounts for the costs a bank failure imposes on deposit insurance.
Moreover, given our interest in the impact of depositor preference on the monitoring
incentives of the supervisor, and given that the impact of this law on the cost of
bank funding has been widely researched, we make the simplifying assumption that
bank creditors charge the bank an exogenous interest rate.25 We continue to assume
that bank liabilities are equal to one unit, but now half of them are insured deposits,
and the other half is comprised of uninsured deposits or interbank claims. We ensure
comparability with the previous sections by normalizing all variables in terms of
total liabilities instead of deposits. Under these conditions, the optimal social policy
deﬁned in Section 2 still applies.26
These assumptions allow us to focus on the impact of the depositor preference
on the monitoring incentives of the supervisor without having to take into account
the impact of repricing that will also occur as the non-deposit creditors, for example,
switch from being senior to being junior.27 Note that even in the absence of repricing,
the simple presence of non-deposit claims will inﬂuence the monitoring incentives of a
supervisor who accounts for deposit insurance losses, as the priority of deposit claims
in bankruptcy is altered. A reason is that, as has been shown in the literature (see,
24There has been a great deal of interest on the proposals to require banks to issue subordinated
debt. The focus of this literature, however, has been on the monitoring exercised by subordinated
debtholders rather than on the potential impact of their presence on the monitoring incentives of
bank supervisors (see Board of Governors (1999) for a review of this literature).
25See Hirschhorn and Zervos (1990), Osterberg (1996) and Osterberg and Thomson (1999) for an
analysis of the impact of depositor preference on the cost of a bank’s funding sources.
26Implicit here is our assumption that the social planner takes into account the value of the bank,
that of the deposit insurance agency, that of the bank’s other creditors as well as audit and social
bankruptcy costs.
27Note that under these conditions, if our supervisor were also to account for the losses that a
bankruptcy imposes on the bank’s creditors (other than the depositors) we would be back to the
setting of Subsection 4.2.
20for example, references in Footnote 10), creditors’ incentives to monitor a borrower
depend not only on the seniority of their claim but also on the ﬁnancial condition
of the borrower at the time they are able to exert monitoring. A junior creditor,
for example, has “good” incentives to monitor a ﬁnancially sound borrower but has
“poor” incentives to monitor a ﬁnancially distressed borrower. When the ﬁnancial
condition of the borrower deteriorates beyond a certain point, the incentives of a
junior creditor become aligned with those of the borrower.
This result seems to suggest that a depositor-preference law is detrimental to
supervisors’ incentives to monitor banks. For, if depositors had a junior claim, a
supervisor with deposit insurance responsibilities would have a strong incentive to
monitor a ﬁnancially sound bank and he would not let the bank’s ﬁnancial condition
deteriorate beyond a certain point. This arrangement complemented, for example,
with a regulation requiring banks to be ﬁnancially sound at the beginning of their
operations would rule out those states where the supervisor has “poor” monitoring
incentives. Implicit in this reasoning, however, is the assumption that the supervisor
is able to monitor the bank’s ﬁnancial condition continuously. When, as in our model,
continuous auditing is not feasible and the bank’s ﬁnancial condition changes between
on-site examinations, a depositor-preference law may have conﬂicting eﬀects on the
monitoring that occurs at each examination vis-a-vis the social optimum.
The conﬂicts we want to illustrate can be put as follows. We use as short cuts
the expressions “senior supervisor” and “junior supervisor” to refer to a situation
where either insured depositors or other creditors are given preference, respectively.
Suppose it is possible to require banks that want to start operations to have a ﬁnan-
cial condition suﬃciently sound so that a junior supervisor would choose at the ﬁrst
examination the optimal time to the next examination. Banks’ ﬁnancial condition,
however, may deteriorate to a point where at the next examination the junior super-
visor will decide to let them operate, although the social optimum would command
that they should be closed and a senior supervisor would choose to do so. Similarly,
for a diﬀerent set of initial conditions, the senior supervisor can take the right decision
at the ﬁrst examination although, if the bank is allowed to operate and its situation
improves, the junior supervisor would do better at the second examination. In what
follows, and to simplify the analysis, we limit our study of depositor-preference laws
to the illustration of these conﬂicts by contrasting the actions taken by the supervisor
when depositors have opposite priority rights.
To facilitate the analysis, we introduce the indicator variable δ, which takes the
value one when insured depositors have a senior claim vis-a-vis the other creditors
over the bank’s assets and zero when they have a junior claim. Taking these priority
rules into account and building on the terminology introduced in the previous section,
we redeﬁne the “preventive” and “curative” cost functions as
Cs (g,δ)=c
￿

























21Figure 3: Bankruptcy costs with junior and senior rights.
respectively, where ∆=cb − c￿
s is the maximum cost reduction following early reso-
lution and (g/g)
λ is the discount factor. The immediate closure gain28 is now
Γdi
0 (g,δ)=Cb(g,δ) − Cs(g,δ).
5.1 Impact on the second-examination closure rule
Figure 3 displays the preventive and curative cost functions for δ =0(junior supervi-
sor) and δ =1(senior supervisor) for a particular conﬁguration of parameters.29 The
diﬀerence Cb−Cs, when positive, is the cost relief that can be obtained by supervisors
when they close the bank at the time of the second examination.
The junior supervisor closes the bank if g is in the range (￿ gj,ˇ gj) and, in particular,
when the bank just meets its debt obligations at g = r −µ. He leaves the bank open
when g>ˇ gj. Important to note, however, is that when the bank ﬁnancial condition
is worse, that is, when g is in the range (￿ gj,￿ gj), the junior supervisor chooses to
let the bank continue in operation. For even lower values of g, that is in the region
(g,￿ gj), the supervisor closes preventively in order to save on bankruptcy costs, as
bank shareholders are about to pull out themselves.
In contrast, the senior supervisor winds up the bank in the range (g,￿ gs) and,
in particular, when it is in ﬁnancial distress at g =( r − µ)/2. Note that, and this
28The expressions for the corresponding deferred closure gain and related functions are omitted
for the sake of brevity. They involve an additional term noted T, the expression of which is displayed
in the proof of Proposition 3.
29Parameters are set as in Section 3.1 with cs =0 .1, c￿
s =0 .45 and cb =0 .5.F o r cs =0 .1 the
adequately capitalized threshold g2 of the social planner is inﬁnite.
22is the important result, when g is in the range (￿ gj,￿ gs), the bank is insolvent, the
social planner would close the bank as would the senior supervisor, but the junior
supervisor chooses instead to let the bank operate. The proposition below gives a
suﬃcient condition for this to follow.
Proposition 6 Assume σ2 >r+ µ, γ =0 , 2cs ≤ cb ≤ 1/2 and c￿
s suﬃciently close
to cb. Then, at the time of the second examination:
(a) The socially optimum closure rule is higher than the insolvency level, that is,
￿ g>g ∗ = r − µ;
(b) The junior supervisor’s stopgap closure rule is as follows: He closes the bank in
the ranges (g,￿ gj) and (￿ gj, ˇ gj), but leaves it open in the range (￿ gj,￿ gj) and when
g>ˇ gj, with g<￿ gj <g ∗/2 < ￿ gj <g ∗ < ˇ gj ≷ ￿ g;
(c) The senior supervisor’s stopgap rule is as follows: He closes the bank in the
range (g,￿ gs), and leaves it open when g>￿ gs with g∗/2 < ￿ gs ≷ ￿ g;
(d) If ￿ gs < ￿ g, there exists a range (￿ gj,￿ gs) where it is socially optimal to close the
bank, the senior supervisor closes it and the junior supervisor opts to let it
continue in operation.
Our assumptions in the proposition above have the following interpretation. The
ﬁrst two have the eﬀect of lowering the liquidation value g/(r − µ) below one half,
so that even senior creditors do not get full protection. As shown in Section 3.1,
such a low participation constraint obtains whenever shareholders attach a signiﬁcant
value to the option of abandoning the bank. The third assumption, cs ≤ cb/2,
is normative and ensures that the social planner will not allow insolvent banks to
remain in operation at the time of the last examination. (Recall from Section 3.1
that the bank is insolvent when g<g ∗ and that shareholders are always willing to
maintain an insolvent bank as long as g>g.) Finally, the condition cb ≤ 1/2 requires
that insured deposits be at least as large as bankruptcy costs, so that supervisors lean
signiﬁcantly on the standing of the deposit insurance system.
Proposition 6 shows how a depositor-preference law can aﬀect supervisors’ incen-
tives at the time of the second examination. The social planner would close banks
forever in the range (g,￿ g). By comparison, the junior supervisor is too lenient with
high-risk banks, that is in the range (g,￿ gj), although he makes the right decision in
the insolvency region around g = r − µ. In contrast, the senior supervisor makes
the right decision concerning all high-risk banks, but can be much too forbearing
regarding insolvent banks. For example, if deposit insurance losses do not outrun
bankruptcy costs when the bank fails voluntarily,30 one can show that ￿ gs < ￿ g.T h u s ,
neither supervisor can correctly implement the socially optimal “stopgap” policy
when the preference legislation successfully contains the senior supervisor’s exposure
to deposit insurance losses.
30The exact condition is 1/2 −g/(r − µ) ≤ cb.
23Figure 4: Junior vs. senior time to examination
5.2 Impact on the time to the next examination
Solving the model backwards, we now consider supervisors’ decision regarding the
time to the next examination when they ﬁrst examine the bank. The time-to-
examination functions are exhibited in Figure 4.
The supervisory policy of the senior supervisor conforms to the usual pattern. The
bank is closed when its cash ﬂow is less than gs
1. The undercapitalized level is lower
than the social optimum g1, and the time-to-examination function θs is uniformly
higher than the socially optimal θ.











3 the bank is closed. At g = g
j
1, the junior
supervisor weighs the downside risk of bad performance against the upside potential
for good performance. The bank’s ﬁnancial position can improve. If it is declared
insolvent at the time of the second examination, he will partake in the recoveries.
There is more to gain from the upside potential than to loose from the downside risk.
The junior supervisor chooses to wait a long time.
Putting together the results of the last two subsections, we see that if we use the
ﬁrst-period θ(g) and the second-period ￿ g as proxies for the frequency and stiﬀness
of supervision, respectively, the senior supervisor is a relatively poor monitor for
sound banks and the junior supervisor a relatively poor monitor for problem banks.
Here, the qualiﬁcation “poor” refers to the distance between the actual controls and
the optimal values that a social planner would set. The thrust of our model is
that neither supervisor can perform the best monitoring when the bank’s ﬁnancial
condition cannot be observed continuously.
24Because the bank’s ﬁnancial condition can change between on-site examinations,
the aforementioned conﬂicts arise. To go back to the example alluded to at the
beginning of this section, suppose that the supervisor was made junior by a change
in depositor-preference legislation. As of the ﬁrst period, the junior supervisor could
be seen as doing a reasonable job at approximating the social optimum when the
bank’s initial g is suﬃciently high, but a poor job when g is low. Of course, the
legislator could rule out the latter problem by stating in the law that to enter the
banking business, a bank needs to have a high cash ﬂow to be granted a charter.
This, however, does not solve the entirety of the problem, because when the time for
the second examination arrives, the bank may ﬁnd itself in a poor ﬁnancial condition.
In this situation, the supervisor will realize that the deposit insurance agency risks
bearing the full brunt of the losses, and will resolve to let the bank continue instead
of closing it immediately.
6 Final remarks
We have identiﬁed the role of some key determinants of a trade-oﬀthat bank su-
pervisors face when they have less information than banks: balancing the costs of
supervision against their ability to monitor banks eﬀectively. In doing that, we have
focused on the impact of these determinants on the actions that supervisors can un-
dertake, namely the time interval between on-site examinations and the corrective
policies they apply at the time of examinations.
As one would expect, the way supervisors make these choices varies with their
mandate as deﬁned by the government. We saw, for example, that making an inde-
pendent supervisor accountable for the losses a bank failure imposes on the provider
of deposit insurance in general reduces the excessive forbearance of the independent
supervisor and may also improve on the frequency of on-site examinations. However,
when the bank is also ﬁnanced with non-insured deposits a new array of issues arises.
We chose to focus on the relative priority of creditors’ claims. Several countries have
made depositors senior vis-a-vis other creditors in an attempt to reduce the losses to
the provider of deposit insurance. Researchers have already noted that these laws
aﬀect the relative cost of banks’ funding sources. Our paper extends this literature
by showing that they also aﬀect the monitoring incentives of bank supervisors who
are accountable for deposit insurance losses.
Our key insight in this regard is that when continuous auditing is not possible and
the bank’s ﬁnancial condition may change between on-site examinations, depositor-
preference may have conﬂicting eﬀects on the “quality” of bank supervision. What-
ever the chosen priority rule, supervisors will apply their policies at diﬀerent points
in time, under possibly very diﬀerent ﬁnancial conditions of the bank. Therefore, the
same set of conditions that motivate them to perform frequent on-site examinations
at a given time may also lead them to be forbearing when the next examination
comes, thereby increasing unexpected failures with the corresponding higher costs of
bankruptcy.
25To conclude, it is worth noting that the conﬂicting eﬀects of a depositor-preference
law we highlighted above in the context of bank supervision apply more broadly to
a lender-borrower relationship because they derive from the general principle that a
lender’s monitoring incentives depend not only on the priority of his claim but also on
the ﬁnancial condition of the borrower at the time of monitoring. The literature on
the design of bank loans often builds on this principle to explain the optimal priority
of bank claims. Nonetheless, the conﬂicting eﬀects we illustrated here are absent
from this literature. A reason is that, in contrast to our model, this literature con-
siders settings where the bank monitors the borrower only once during their lending
relationship.
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28Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Let g be the closure point and τ =i n f{t : gt ≤ g}. The discount factor h1 (g)=
E [e−rτ]g(0)=g solves Lh1 −rh1 =0 , where L is the inﬁnitesimal generator associated
with the diﬀusion (1). The limit conditions are h1 (g)=1and limg→∞h1(g)=0 .
This yields h1 (g)=( g/g)
λ, where λ is the negative root of the characteristic equation
(σ2/2)λ2 +( µ − σ2/2)λ − r =0 .








































as desired. Finally, the optimal closure point g follows from the smooth pasting
condition V ￿ (g)=0 .
Proof of Proposition 2
Let G(θ,g) be the deferred closure gain derived from leaving the bank in operation
till θ. One has
g
r − µ




















e−rt(gt − r)dt + e−rθ (WAI(gθ) − ξ);τ>θ
￿
,
where ξ is the cost of auditing the bank. The ﬁrst term is the social welfare obtained
when the bank defaults before θ, the second the social welfare if the bank is still in



























































= WAI(gθ) − Γ(gθ).
Thus
G(θ,g)=e−rθE [Γ(gθ) − ξ;τ>θ ],
from which the Bellman equation (4) is derived. Using (14) below, one can check
that ∂G/∂g < 0 at (θ(g),g).T h u sΓ(g) < Γ(g)=cb − cs. A necessary condition for
G to be positive for some (θ,g) is ξ<c b − cs. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3
We compute expectations (under Q) of the form
K (t,g)=E [V (gt);τ ≥ t]
for a given function V . Solving (1) yields gt = gexp{(µ − σ2/2)t + σ ￿ wt}. Using
Girsanov’s theorem, we can construct an equivalent probability P such that wt =
￿ wt + νt, where ν =( µ − σ2/2)/σ, is a standard Brownian motion under P.
Under P, the expectation above takes the form
K (t,g)=E
P [V (gt)ηt;τ ≥ t]
= E
P [V (gt)ηt;τ ≥ t and gt ≥ g]
= E
P [V (gt)ηt;gt ≥ g] − E
P [V (gt)ηt;gt ≥ g and τ<t ],
where gt = gexp(σwt) and ηt =e x p{νwt − ν2t/2} is the density process of Q with
respect to P. The ﬁrst expectation on the right-hand side can be expressed as
H (t,g)=E [V (gt);gt ≥ g]
= E








where we have put α = −ln(g/g)/σ.
The second expectation on the right-hand side can in turn be assessed by invoking
the reﬂection principle







wt < 2α − x,inf
t w<α
￿
= P (wt < 2α − x),






dx. The change of
variable y = x − 2α yields the formula









We now deﬁne the functions
R(t,g; ￿ g)=Q(τ ≥ t and gt ≤ ￿ g)
B (t,g; ￿ g)=e−rtE
￿
(gt/g)
λ; τ ≥ t and gt ≤ ￿ g
￿
ϕ(t,g)=Q(τ ≥ t),

























































































































where k =l n ( ￿ g/g)/σ, h2 = h/h1 and Φ is the cumulative normal distribution. In
particular,
ϕ(t,g)=R(t,g;∞)
=Φ( −w) − h(g)Φ(−z).
The results of Proposition 3 follow by noting that G1 in (6) can be written as
G1 (t,g)=cbB (t,g;￿ g) − e−rtcsR(t,g;￿ g) − e−rtξϕ(t,g).
31Proof of Proposition 4
(a) The second-period threshold is ￿ g = g(cs/cb)
1/λ and the ﬁrst-period boundaries
g1 and g2 are given in Proposition 2. In taking derivatives, we repeatedly use the
fact that the partial derivatives ∂G1/∂t and ∂G1/∂￿ g are zero at t = θ(g) and ￿ g =
g (cs/cb)
1/λ. It is clear that ∂￿ g/∂cs < 0.







The numerator is positive because ∂G1/∂cs = −e−rtQ(τ ≥ t and gt ≤ ￿ g) is larger















If ∂R/∂t is negative, then ∂θ/∂cs > 0 and the proposition follows. We provide a
suﬃcient condition under which both ∂R/∂t and ∂B/∂t are negative.




+ q − k +(q + k)e−2kq/t − 2qekβ−kq/t+k2/(2t).
After some manipulation, we ﬁnd that Bt has the sign of F (t;κ), where, as in the
proof of Proposition 3, κ =
√
2r + ν2, and that Rt has the sign of F (t;−ν). Moreover,
F (t;κ) − F (t;−ν) has the sign of cbBt − e−rtcsRt, which is negative at θ according
to the ﬁrst order condition.
It can be veriﬁed that F(t,β) is always negative when q<k / 2, that the diﬀerence
F (t;κ)−F (t;−ν) is ﬁrst positive and eventually negative when q>k / 2 and that, if
the two curves F(t;κ) and F(t;−ν) intersect below the horizontal axis, both Bt and











Substituting in F, we ﬁnd the envelope














The intersection between F (t;κ) and F (t,−ν) lies below the horizontal axis if −ν<
κ<κ c = φc, where φc = θc(k,q) is the unique solution to F (t)=0 . Given that
32ν =( µ − σ2/2)/σ, this can be written equivalently as µ ≥ µc(σ, cb/cs,g/g) where




Proof of Proposition 5























so that Γ0(g)=Γ ( g,0) and Γdi
0 (g)=Γ ( g,1). We want to show that ∂￿ gdi/∂α and
∂gdi
2 /∂α are positive for all α ∈ [0,1].
(a) Consider ﬁrst the stopgap closure rule ￿ gdi(α), which solves Γ(g,α)=0 .T h e
condition Cdi
b (r−µ) <c ￿
s ensures that this equation has a unique solution below r−µ.
We have ∂￿ gdi/∂α = −(∂Γ/∂α)/(∂Γ/∂g). The numerator ∂Γ/∂α is given by ψ(g)
in (11). The function ψ vanishes at g = g, is convex on the interval (g,r− µ) and












and this implies ψ￿(g) ≥ 0.T h u sψ(g) is positive for all g>g. Since the denominator
∂Γ/∂g is negative at g = ￿ g(α), the result follows.
(b) The threshold gdi




where the deferred closure gain G is derived from Γdi




0 (gθ);τ>θand gθ ≤ ￿ gdi￿
− e−rθξϕ(θ,g).
We have ∂gdi






ψ(gθ);τ>θand gθ < ￿ gdi￿
.
The integrand is positive for all g ≥ g.T h u s∂gdi
2 /∂α > 0.
Proof of Proposition 6
(a) We have ￿ g>g ∗ if and only if (−λ/(1 − λ))λ <c b/cs.B u t λ>−1 when
σ2 >r+ µ and γ =0 ,s o(−λ/(1− λ))λ < 2 ≤ cb/cs.
(b) Since g/(r − µ) < 1/2, the condition ￿ gj <g ∗/2 is met when c￿
s is suﬃciently
close to cb. Next, the condition Cb >C s at g = r − µ and δ =0is equivalent to
(cb +1 /2)((r − µ)/g)
λ >c ￿
s. Using the deﬁnition of g in Proposition 1, we ﬁnd that












33We know show that the right-hand side of (15) is less than one. Since ρ ≥ r,t h i s
will imply that the inequality is met. The right-hand side of (15) is less than one
if cb >c ￿
s(−λ/(1 − λ))λ − 1/2. The function φ(λ)=( −λ/(1 − λ))λ is decreasing
over λ>−1 and φ(λ) <φ (−1) = 2. Together with c￿
s ≤ 1/2, this implies that
(−λ/(1 − λ))λc￿
s <c ￿
s +1 /2. It follows that cb >c ￿
s > (−λ/(1 − λ))λc￿
s − 1/2,a s
desired. So (15) is satisﬁed.
(c) Similarly for the senior case, the condition Cb >C s at g =( r−µ)/2 and δ =1
is equivalent to cb >c ￿
s((2g/(r − µ))λ + g/(r − µ) − 1/2. Deﬁne the function f as
f(x)=csxλ +( x − 1)/2 and let x∗ < 1 solve f(x∗)=cb. The last inequality can be









Requiring the right-hand side of condition (16) to be less than one is equivalent to
cb >f(−2λ/(1 − λ)). Now the function
φ(λ)=
1/2+λ/(1 − λ)
(−2λ/(1− λ))λ − 1
is increasing and φ(λ) > limλ↓−1 φ(λ)=1 /2. Together with c￿
s ≤ 1/2, this implies
that c￿
s <φ (λ) or, equivalently, f(−2λ/(1− λ)) <c ￿
s <c b and (16) is true.
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